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Abstract	
The	 offshoring	 of	 high‐tech	 services	 has	 greatly	 increased	 in	 recent	 years,	 with	
consequences	for	firms	demand	for	skilled	employment	in	firms.	This	paper	specifically	
analyzes	the	relationship	between	R&D	offshoring	and	the	demand	for	R&D	employment	
using	 firm‐level	 data	 for	 Spanish	 manufacturing	 and	 services	 companies	 during	 the	
period	 2004‐2009.	 Estimating	 different	 specifications	 with	 panel	 data	 techniques,	 we	
find	 that	 this	 association	 is	 statistically	 positive.	 In	 particular,	 for	 services	 firms	 a	 1	
percentage	point	increase	in	R&D	offshoring	raises	the	demand	for	researchers	by	about	
11%.	This	suggests	the	existence	of	complementarity	among	them	as	productive	inputs.		
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1.	Introduction	
	
The	frequency	with	which	companies	have	made	use	of	offshoring	strategies	has	greatly	
increased	in	recent	years	(OECD,	2010).	Although	initially	offshoring	referred	mainly	to	
intermediate	manufacturing	goods,	over	the	last	decade,	the	offshoring	of	manufacturing	
goods	 has	 taken	 a	 back	 seat	 to	 the	 offshoring	 of	 services,	 since	 the	 demand	 for	more	
advanced	services	in	technical	and	administrative	areas	has	substantially	grown	(Jensen,	
2009;	Metters	and	Verma,	2008).		
	
As	 a	 consequence,	 standardized	 activities	 of	 unskilled	 workers	 in	 manufacturing	
industries	 have	 ceased	 to	 be	 the	 only	 subject	 of	 offshoring	 and,	 nowadays,	 the	
comparative	 advantage	of	 countries	 is	not	only	be	 associated	with	natural	 or	physical	
capital,	 but	 also	 with	 human	 capital.	 Some	 countries	 are	 specializing	 in	 technological	
jobs	 and	 in	 the	 development	 of	 computational	 concepts,	 making	 offshoring	 a	 way	 to	
contract	 the	necessary	 services	 for	domestic	production	 in	other	 countries,	 improving	
delivery	 times	 and	 the	 capacity	 for	 interaction,	 and	without	 having	 in	many	 cases	 to	
transport	any	physical	goods.		
	
However,	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 offshoring	 of	 highly	 technological	 services	 has	 not	
happened	without	 problems.	When	 a	white‐collar	 worker,	 who	 is	 usually	 better	 paid	
because	of	her	experience	 in	ICTs	and	her	ability	to	 learn,	 is	“relocated”,	some	specific	
knowledge	of	 the	company	 is	destroyed.	As	a	 result	of	 the	absence	of	valuable	human	
capital,	the	incentives	of	administrators	and	employees	to	invest	in	gaining	such	specific	
knowledge	diminish	(Trefler,	2005).		
	
Offshoring	of	high‐tech	tasks	leads	to	more	frequent	separations	between	workers	and	
companies,	destroying	 important	dimensions	of	human	capital.	 It	 is	not	 clear	whether	
the	loss	of	knowledge	that	arises	from	the	separation	of	the	company	and	the	workers	is	
an	issue	of	equity,	given	that	it	can	be	harmful	for	workers	displaced	by	offshoring,	or	a	
matter	of	efficiency,	since	it	destroys	valuable	human	capital.		
	
In	this	context,	many	researches	have	focused	on	analyzing	how	materials	and	services	
offshoring	 affect	 the	 demand	 for	 skilled	 and	 unskilled	workers,	 or	 on	 their	 impact	 on	
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wages	and	welfare.	Although	the	majority	of	these	studies	are	done	on	a	per‐country	and	
industry	basis,	recent	studies	have	attempted	to	distinguish	between	different	levels	of	
education	 and	 occupations,	 suggesting	 in	 general	 that	 services	 offshoring	 generates	 a	
positive	 effect	 on	 employment	 and	 wages	 for	 skilled	 workers	 and	 the	 opposite	 for	
unskilled	workers	(Crinò,	2010).			
	
The	 objective	 of	 our	 study	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 debate	 by	 analyzing	 the	 intra‐firm	
impact	of	offshoring	on	the	demand	for	one	of	the	most	qualified	workers:	researchers	
involved	 in	 R&D	 activities.	 For	 this	 purpose,	we	 use	 the	 information	 of	 Spanish	 firms	
available	 for	 the	period	2004‐2009	 from	the	Panel	of	Technological	 Innovation	PITEC,	
created	by	the	INE	(the	Spanish	Institute	of	Statistics)	on	the	basis	of	the	annual	Spanish	
responses	 to	 the	Community	 Innovation	 Survey	 (CIS).	Due	 to	 rising	 unemployment	 in	
Spain	in	recent	years,	now	it	is	essential	to	emphasize	the	discussion	about	the	changes	
needed	 to	 achieve	 sustained	 long	 –	 term	 growth.	 According	 the	 OECD	 (2011),	 Spain	
needs	 to	 create	 policies	 to	 increase	 productivity,	 encourage	 greater	 investment	 in	
innovative	 sectors,	 and	 channel	 investment	 into	 human	 capital.	 This	 is	 important	 in	
order	to	continue	diversifying	production	and	maintaining	support	for	processes	such	as	
the	internationalization	of	Spanish	enterprises.			
	
The	specific	contribution	of	our	study	is	twofold:	Firstly,	we	analyze	a	particular	type	of	
offshoring:	 the	 purchases	 of	 R&D	 services1	 that	 domestic	 firms	 contract	 from	 foreign	
providers.	 These	 highly	 technological	 activities	 may	 have	 a	 stronger	 effect	 on	 the	
demand	for	skilled	labor.	Just	as	Markusen	(2005)	states,	white‐collar	services	that	are	
marketed	are	crucial	complements	for	different	elements	of	the	production	chain,	such	
as	 between	 skilled	 labor	 and	 the	 telecommunications	 and	 infrastructure	 teams.		
Furthermore,	Crinò	(2010)	emphasizes	that	white‐collar	workers	employed	in	services	
activities	usually	do	good	work	and	receive	high	wages.	This	work	requires	a	high	level	
of	knowledge,	and	although	 in	the	past	 they	were	protected	from	offshoring,	currently	
they	are	more	exposed	to	it.			
	
Secondly,	we	use	 individual	 firm‐level	 data	 and	 therefore	 the	 effects	 of	 offshoring	 are	
                                                 
1 R&D services are defined in our database as: “Creative work to increase the volume of knowledge and to create 
new or improved products and processes (including the development of software)”. They include, among others, 
engineering services, clinical tests or designs. 
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quantified	within	the	firms	that	undertake	this	offshoring.	This	differs	from	many	other	
studies	 in	 this	 field	 that	use	 aggregate	data	 for	 countries	or	 industries	or	 information	
about	 occupations.	 In	 addition,	 the	 panel	 structure	 of	 our	 database	 allows	 the	 use	 of	
suitable	econometric	methods	to	control	for	the	heterogeneity	of	firms.		
	
Our	 results	 suggest	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 positive	 relation	 between	 R&D	 offshoring	 and	
skilled	 employment	 for	 Spanish	 firms,	 providing	 evidence	 in	 favor	 of	 their	
complementarity.	 In	 addition,	we	 find	 that	 this	 association	 is	 stronger	 in	 the	 services	
sector	than	in	the	manufacturing	sector.		
	
The	 study	 has	 the	 following	 structure.	 In	 Section	 2,	 we	 summarize	 the	 previous	
literature	about	the	relations	between	outsourcing,	offshoring	and	skilled	labor.	Section	
3	includes	a	description	of	the	empirical	model,	the	database	and	the	main	variables.	In	
Section	4,	we	present	the	results	and,	finally,	in	Section	5,	we	conclude.			
	
2.	Outsourcing,	offshoring	and	skilled	labor:	State	of	the	art	
	
Literature	 analyzing	 the	 impact	 of	 international	 outsourcing	 on	 labor	 markets	 has	
increased	parallel	 to	 the	process	of	 globalization.	 From	a	 theoretical	point	of	 view,	 an	
important	 group	 of	 papers	 follow	 a	 Helpman	 and	 Krugman	 (1985)	 style	 two‐sector	
general	 equilibrium	model	 of	 trading	 countries	 to	 identify	 the	 forces	 that	 can	 lead	 to	
increased	 outsourcing.	 These	 studies	 are	 a	 usual	 theoretical	 reference	 in	 the	 field	 of	
international	economics.		
	
An	 example	 is	 the	model	 of	 two	 countries,	 North	 and	 South,	 developed	 by	 Glass	 and	
Saggi	 (2001).	 They	 assume	 that	 international	 outsourcing	 in	 basic	 production	 is	
developed	 in	 low‐income	countries,	while	northern	 firms	 import	 components	 that	 are	
used	to	finish	the	production	in	the	north	with	northern	workers.	A	manufactured	good	
is	 produced	 (by	 international	 outsourcing	 in	 the	 south)	with	 continuous	 intermediate	
goods	 that	 differ	 in	 the	 use	 of	 skilled	 and	 unskilled	 workers.	 All	 other	 goods	 are	
produced	 in	 the	 north.	 In	 the	model,	 southern	 firms	 perform	 outsourcing	 only	 in	 the	
basic	 production	 of	 old	 designs,	 but	 new	 developments	 and	 designs	 are	 produced	 in	
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northern	countries.	Outsourcing	is	carried	out	because	of	technological	differences	and	
not	differences	in	factor	endowment	(as	in	Feenstra	and	Hanson,	1996a).	
	
In	a	similar	context	of	two	countries,	Antrás	and	Helpman’s	model	(2004)	assumes	the	
existence	of	heterogeneous	final‐good	producers	that	choose	ownership	structures	and	
locations	 for	 the	 production	 of	 intermediate	 inputs.	 The	 equilibrium	 depends	 on	 the	
wage	differential	between	the	North	and	South,	on	the	ownership	advantage	in	each	of	
the	countries,	on	the	distribution	of	the	bargaining	power	between	final	good	producers	
and	suppliers	of	components,	and	on	the	headquarter	intensity	of	technology.	
	
Also	 from	 a	macroeconomic	 perspective,	 Grossman	 and	 Rossi‐Hansberg	 (2008)	 argue	
that	countries	with	different	stages	of	development,	different	technologies	and	different	
factor	endowments	generate	different	factor	prices.	They	wonder	about	how	offshoring	
opportunities	affect	wages	of	different	types	of	labor	(unskilled	labor	and	skilled	labor).	
Production	technology	is	specified	in	terms	of	tasks	and	each	task	requires	the	input	of	
some	 single	 factor	 of	 production.	 The	 decision	 to	 perform	 tasks	 through	 offshoring	
depends	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 internal	 and	 external	 prices	 and	 communications	
technology.	 The	 model	 assumes	 that	 tasks	 can	 be	 performed	 remotely,	 so	 that	 the	
production	of	a	good	can	be	internationalized.2	
	
Against	 the	 above‐mentioned	 models,	 which	 allow	 for	 explaining	 the	 impact	 of	
offshoring	 on	 labor	 markets	 from	macroeconomic	 models,	 a	 second	 group	 of	 studies	
tries	 to	 analyze	 the	 same	 problem	 from	 a	microeconomic	 perspective.	 	 These	 studies	
usually	 include	 empirical	 approximations	made	with	 data	 from	a	much	 larger	 level	 of	
disaggregation	(firm,	sector,	occupation).		
	
Many	of	these	works	have	centered	in	analyzing	whether	the	 impact	of	outsourcing	or	
offshoring	is	different	for	skilled	workers	(Hijzen	et	al.,	2005;	Canals,	2006;	Ekholm	and	
Hakkala,	 2006;	 Geishecker	 and	 Görg,	 2008	 and	 forthcoming).	 Although	 these	 studies	
show	different	analytic	structures	and	 levels	of	disaggregation	of	data,	 in	general	 they	
find	 that	 highly	 skilled	 workers	 obtain	 a	 wage	 premium	 due	 to	 international	
                                                 
2 Offshoring is	costly	in	the	sense	that	performing	a	task	at	a	distance	requires	a	greater	factor	input	than	if	
the	task	is	performed	nearby,	and	tasks	differ	in	their	costs	of	remote	performance.	
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outsourcing,	 which	 has	 raised	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 wages	 of	 skilled	 workers	 with	
respect	to	the	wages	of	unskilled	workers	in	recent	periods.	This	suggests	the	existence	
of	 a	 complementary	 relationship	 between	 international	 outsourcing	 and	 skilled	
employment,	 although	 its	 significance	 depends	 on	 aspects	 such	 as	 the	 inter‐industrial	
labor	mobility	and	 labor	rigidity,	which	are	also	 influenced	by	public	policies	on	 labor	
markets.			
	
Within	 this	 second	 group	 of	 studies	 we	 want	 to	 emphasize	 the	 ones	 that	 include	 a	
microeconomic	 foundation.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 of	 the	 studies	 by	 Amiti	 and	 Wei	 (2006),	
Criscuolo	 and	Garicano	 (2010),	 and	 Crino	 (2010),	who	begin	with	 the	 existence	 of	 an	
enlarged	 production	 function	 in	 which	 offshoring	 or	 outsourcing	 is	 incorporated.	
Assuming	that	firms	maintain	an	optimizing	behavior,	these	authors	reach	a	function	of	
labor	demand	that	will	be	the	equation	to	be	estimated	in	the	empirical	part.	 	This	will	
be	the	approach	in	our	study,	given	the	type	of	empirical	approximation	that	we	intend	
to	do.3	However,	we	follow	a	firm	level	perspective	instead	of	an	industry	perspective,	
and	we	aim	to	reach	a	greater	specificity	 in	 the	analysis	of	 the	relation	between	 labor	
demand	and	offshoring,	using	the	information	about	offshore	R&D	activities	of	Spanish	
firms.	The	sector	to	which	companies	belong	and	the	type	of	technology	they	use	will	be	
taken	 into	account,	distinguishing	between	skilled	and	unskilled	workers	and	 focusing	
specifically	on	the	firms’	demand	for	researchers	to	perform	inside	R&D	activities.	
	
3.		Model	and	data	
3.1.	The	model	
	
Given	the	type	of	information	available	in	the	PITEC	database,	our	methodology	consists	
of	the	estimation	of	a	conditional	labor	demand	function	in	which	the	offshoring	appears	
as	 a	 key	 determinant.	 This	 approach	 is	 in	 line	with	many	 papers	 that,	 since	 Griliches	
(1979,	1995),	estimate	the	impact	of	R&D	activities	on	productivity	with	firm‐level	data	
starting	 from	 a	 standard	 production	 function	 that	 is	 augmented	 with	 a	 kind	 of	
                                                 
3 A more detailed exposition of the model is done in the next section. 
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technological	 input.4	 In	our	case,	 the	 firm‐level	production	 function	 is	augmented	with	
offshoring	and	 internal	 innovation	activities.	 In	particular,	 the	production	 function	 for	
firm	i	in	industry	j	is	written	as	follows:		
௜ܻ௝ ൌ ܣ௜௝൫݋ݏݏ௜௝, ݅݊݊௜௝൯	ܨ௜௝ሺܮ௜௝ோ&஽, ܮ௜௝ை , ܭ௜௝,ܯ௜௝, ௜ܵ௝ሻ		 	 	 [1]	
where	Y	represents	the	output	that	is	a	function	of	labor,	ܮ ൌ ܮோ&஽ ൅ ܮை,	physical	capital,	
K,	 materials,	M,	 and	 services	 used	 as	 inputs,	 S.	 	 Notice	 that,	 as	 we	 are	 interested	 in	
analyzing	 the	 impact	 of	 R&D	 offshoring	 on	 skilled	 labor,	 we	 distinguish	 between	 the	
researchers	 devoted	 to	 R&D	 activities,	 ܮோ&஽,	 which	 by	 definition	 are	 highly	 qualified	
workers,	and	other	employees,	ܮை.	A	stands	for	the	technical	change,	which	is	a	function	
of	the	offshoring	of	services,	oss	and	also	of	innovation	activities	developed	domestically	
by	the	firm,	inn.	
	
As	 was	 previously	 mentioned,	 in	 this	 article	 our	 concept	 of	 service	 offshoring	 refers	
specifically	 to	 those	activities	 in	research	and	development	carried	out	abroad,	 that	 is,	
purchases	 of	 R&D	 services	 from	 foreign	 providers,	 which	 can	 be	 firms	 of	 the	 same	
group,	firms	outside	the	group,	public	institutions,	universities,	etc.	We	call	this	concept	
R&D	offshoring,	which	is	different	from	the	innovation	activities	developed	domestically	
by	the	firm5,	which	we	denote	by	݅݊݊	in	equation	(1).	
	
As	in	Amiti	and	Wei	(2006),	we	assume	that	the	process	of	minimizing	costs	happens	in	
two	stages:	in	the	first	stage,	the	firm	chooses	the	quantity	of	traditional	inputs,	while	in	
a	 second	 stage	 it	 chooses	 the	 proportion	 in	which	 it	will	 import	material	 and	 service	
inputs.6	We	also	suppose	that	all	 firms	in	the	same	industry	face	identical	input	prices,	
including	 imported	 inputs	 and	 physical	 capital.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 conditional	 labor	
demand	function	for	R&D	employees	can	be	expressed	as:			
ܮ௜௝ோ&஽ ൌ ௚ೕ൫࢝ೕ,௢௦௦೔ೕ,௜௡௡೔ೕ,௒೔ೕ൯஺ೕ൫௢௦௦೔ೕ,௜௡௡೔ೕ൯ 		 	 	 	 	 [2]	
                                                 
4 Griffith et al. (2006) follow this approach to provide evidence for technology sourcing from the U.S.. The 
OECD (2007) also uses a similar model to measure the impact on the demand for labour of outsourcing 
production abroad. The model is estimated using sectoral data for 12 OECD countries for years 1995 and 2000.  
5 In particular, this concept includes internal R&D activities (regardless of the remuneration to researchers to 
avoid double accounting), domestic R&D outsourcing and other innovation expenditures. 
6 In addition, the fixed cost of importing services and material inputs may vary by industry. As Amiti and Wei 
(2006) justify, the level of the sophistication of the inputs are different for each industry, and hence will involve 
different amounts of search costs to be imported. 
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where	࢝௝ ൌ ሺݓ௝ோ, ݓ௝ை, ݎ௝	, ݍ௝௠, ݍ௝௦ሻ	 is	 the	 vector	 of	 input	 prices	 that	 correspond,	
respectively,	 to	 the	wages	 of	 researchers,	 the	wages	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 employees,	 the	
rental	rate	on	capital,	and	the	prices	for	materials	and	service	inputs.		
	
As	 is	 common	 in	 the	 empirical	 literature	 (Hamermesh,	 1993;	 Criscuolo	 and	 Garicano,	
2010;	Crinò,	2010),	 this	equation	of	 conditional	 labor	demand	will	be	estimated	using	
the	following	log‐linear	specification:			
ln	ܮ௜௝ோ&஽ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ࢼ࢝ᇱ n࢝࢐ ൅ ൅ߚ௢௦ 	ln ݋ݏݏ௜௝ ൅ 	ߚ௜௡௡ln	݅݊݊௜௝ ൅ ߚ௒ln	 ௜ܻ௝ ൅ ࢼ࢞ᇱ ࢄ࢏࢐ ൅	ߝ௜௝								[3]	
where	X	stands	for	a	vector	of	other	control	variables	that	will	be	explained	afterwards	
and		ߝ௜௝	is		the		residual		with		the		usual		properties.	In	this	conditional	demand	function,	
if	 R&D	 offshoring	 increases	 productivity,	 we	 would	 expect	 the	 offshoring	 to	 have	 a	
negative	effect	on	 the	demand	 for	R&D	employment,	 since	 fewer	 inputs	are	needed	to	
produce	the	same	amount	of	output.	
	
Alternatively,	 if	we	 substitute	 in	 equation	 [2]	 for	 the	 firm’s	 profit	maximizing	 level	 of	
output,	which	 is	 also	 a	 function	of	 offshoring,	 the	 following	demand	 function	 for	R&D	
labor	would	be	obtained:	
ܮ௜ோ&஽ ൌ ௚ೕ൫࢝ೕ,௢௦௦೔,௜௡௡೔ೕ,௣೔൯஺ೕ൫௢௦௦೔,௜௡௡೔ೕ൯ 	 	 	 	 	 [4]	
which	in	terms	of	the	log‐linear	specification	will	be	equivalent	to:	
ln	ܮ௜௝ோ&஽ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ࢼ࢝	ᇱ ln࢝࢐ ൅ ߚ௢௦ 	ln ݋ݏݏ௜௝ ൅ 	ߚ௜௡௡	ln	݅݊݊௜௝ ൅ ߚ௣	ln	݌௜௝ ൅ ࢼ࢞ᇱ ࢄ࢏࢐ ൅	ߝ௜௝								 [5]	
	
The	 way	 in	 which	 offshoring	 affects	 labor	 demand	 in	 this	 equation	 is	 not	 easily	
identifiable,	 and,	 furthermore,	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	 questions	we	 seek	 to	 answer	 in	 this	
study.	In	line	with	Amity	and	Wei	’s	(2006)	arguments,	R&D	offshoring	could	affect	the	
demand	for	researchers	through	three	main	channels:	
1) A	substitution	effect	through	the	price	of	imported	services.	A	fall	in	that	price	would	
lead	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 demand	 for	 researchers	 if	 R&D	 labor	 and	 R&D	 services	
were	substitutes.	However,	the	effect	could	be	the	opposite	if	they	are	complements.		
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2) A	 productivity	 effect	 if	 R&D	 offshoring	 leads	 to	 improvements	 in	 efficiency.	 Firms	
may	 produce	 the	 same	 quantity	 of	 a	 product	 with	 fewer	 inputs,	 reducing	 their	
demand	for	labor	inputs.		
3) A	 scale	 effect	 if,	 as	 R&D	 offshoring	 makes	 the	 company	 more	 efficient	 and	
competitive,	 the	 demand	 for	 its	 product	 increases	 and,	 as	 a	 consecuence,	 the	 firm	
also	hires	more	employees.	
	
The	 net	 effect	 of	 R&D	 offshoring	 through	 these	 three	 channels	 will	 be	 captured	 in	
coefficient		ߚ௢௦.		In	our	firm‐level	context,	it	is	not	easy	to	predict	which	effect	will	be	the	
predominant	 effect	 and	 in	 fact	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	 main	 questions	 we	 want	 to	 answer	
empirically	in	the	study.			
	
3.2.	Description	of	the	database	and	main	variables	
	
The	empirical	analysis	is	done	with	the	information	provided	in	the	Panel	of	Innovation	
Technology	 (PITEC),	 from	2004	 to	2009.	This	database	 is	 carried	out	by	 the	 INE	 (The	
Spanish	 Statistics	 Institute)	 and	 encloses	 micro‐data	 on	 Spanish	 firms’	 innovation	
activities	 and	 their	 conditions	 for	 scientific	 research.	 Although	 the	 PITEC	 includes	 a	
sample	of	firms	that	do	not	undertake	technological	activities,	given	the	objective	of	this	
study,	we	 focus	 the	analysis	 in	 the	 sample	of	 innovative	 firms,	 that	 is,	 firms	 that	have	
positive	innovation	expenditures	during	the	period.	
	
This	 database	 allows	 us	 to	 study	 offshoring	 activities	 for	 the	 highest	 knowledge	
intensive	input:	Research	and	Development	(R&D).	The	database	provides	information	
about	 the	 R&D	 done	 within	 the	 firm	 (in‐house	 R&D)	 or	 outside	 the	 firm	 through	 a	
contract	or	 an	agreement	 (external	R&D).	Also,	purchasing	 services	may	 take	place	 in	
Spain	or	 abroad,	 and	 the	 suppliers	may	be	 firms	of	 the	 same	group,	 firms	outside	 the	
group,	 public	 institutions,	 universities,	 etc.	With	 this	 in	mind,	 we	 	 use	 the	 term	R&D	
outsourcing	 for	 the	 purchases	 of	 R&D	 services	 (without	 taxes)	 from	 firms	 or	 other	
organizations	outside	the	group	(if	the	company	belongs	to	a	group)	and	the	term	R&D	
offshoring	 (oss)	 for	the	purchases	of	R&D	services	abroad,	regardless	of	 the	 location	of	
the	provider.	International	outsourcing	will	be	part	of	both	concepts.	
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In	 our	 database,	 around	 7%	 of	 firms	 engaged	 in	 offshore	 R&D	 activities	 during	 the	
period.	 In	 the	 manufacturing	 sector	 R&D	 offshoring	 is	 greater	 than	 in	 the	 services	
sector:	 8%	 of	 manufacturing	 firms	 purchase	 R&D	 services	 abroad,	 while	 for	 service	
firms	 this	 percentage	 is	 5%.	 Among	 R&D	 offshorers,	 around	 74%	 belong	 to	 the	
manufacturing	 sector,	 while	 26%	 belong	 to	 the	 services	 sector.	 These	 percentages	
remain	rather	constant	over	time.		
		
In	addition,	 the	presence	of	R&D	offshorers	 is	higher	 in	high	and	medium	tech	sectors	
(see	Table	1).		As	Añón	et	al.	(2010)	point	out,	unlike	low	technology	sectors,	firms	with	
high	 levels	 of	 capital	 intensity	 or	 large	 firms	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 offshore	 high‐tech	
activities	 because	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 manage	 capital	 flows,	 cash	 flow,	 and	 benefits	
through	other	countries.						
Insert	Table	1	about	here	
The	information	included	in	the	PITEC	also	allows	for	distinguishing	which	part	of	total	
employment	in	the	firm	corresponds	to	researchers	devoted	to	R&D	activities.	The	term	
researcher	refers	specifically	to	professionals	who	work	on	the	creation	of	new	concepts,	
products	 or	 processes,	 methods	 and	 systems,	 and	 on	 the	 management	 of	 respective	
projects.7	This	R&D	employment	(LR&D)	 is	our	measure	of	high‐skilled	labor	demand.	In	
our	 sample,	 the	 demand	 for	 researchers	 from	 the	 years	 2004	 to	 2009	 is	 half	 in	
manufacturing	firms	half	(3.6)	of	what	it	is	in	services	firms	(7.1).		
	
As	for	wages,	the	average	wage	for	researchers	(wR)	has	been	obtained	from	the	PITEC	
as	the	quotient	between	total	remunerations	to	researchers	and	R&D	employment.8	As	
can	be	seen	in	Table	2,	regardless	of	the	activity	sector,	the	average	wage	of	researchers	
is	 higher	 in	 firms	 with	 more	 than	 200	 employees	 that	 offshore	 R&D	 activities.	 In	
particular,	the	highest	salaries	are	obtained	by	researchers	that	work	in	large	firms	that	
offshore	 R&D	 and	 operate	 in	 high	 &	 medium‐tech	 services	 sectors.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	
average	 wage	 is	 47.5%	 higher	 when	 compared	 with	 workers	 in	 firms	 with	 similar	
features	in	the	manufacturing	sector.			
                                                 
7 We exclude technicians or assistants in administrative tasks associated with R&D activities from this concept 
technicians or assistants in administrative tasks associated with R&D activities. 
8 We have used sectoral price indexes to homogenize the monetary magnitudes of different years. The year 2007 
is considered the base year. In the case of wages, we use harmonized labor cost indexes by activity class 
provided by the Spanish Institute of Statistics. 
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Insert	Table	2	about	here	
	
The	 definitions	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 variables	 included	 in	 the	 theoretical	 model	 are	 as	
follows.	Domestic	innovation	expenditures	(inn)	are	obtained	as	the	sum	of	in‐house	R&D	
expenditures	 (excluding	 the	 remunerations	 to	 R&D	 employment),	 domestic	 R&D	
outsourcing	 and	 other	 innovation	 expenditures	 (on	 acquisition	 of	 machines,	 services,	
and	 equipment,	 acquisition	 of	 external	 knowledge,	 preparation	 for	 production	 and	
distribution,	 training,	 and	 introduction	 of	 innovations).	 For	manufacturing	 firms,	 total	
output	 (Y)	 is	 obtained	 as	 sales	 deflated	 using	 sectoral	 price	 indexes	 published	 by	 the	
Spanish	 Institute	 of	 Statistics9.	 	 Because	 there	 is	 no	 data	 in	 our	 database	 about	 total	
labor	costs,	as	a	proxy	of	the	wages	of	other	employees	(wO),	we	use	the	average	wage	of	
technicians	and	assistants	in	administrative	tasks	associated	with	R&D	activities.	These	
jobs	have	a	lower	level	of	qualification.	It	is	assumed	that	product	prices	and	the	rest	of	
the	input	prices	are	the	same	for	all	the	firms	in	the	same	industry.	This	is	equivalent	to	
introducing	sectorial	dummies	in	the	model.10				
	
Additionally,	 as	 control	 variables	we	 include	 dummy	 variables	 reflecting	whether	 the	
firm	is	an	exporter,	belongs	to	a	high	or	medium‐tech	activity	sector,	has	more	than	50%	
of	 foreign	 capital	 or	 is	 a	 large	 firm.	As	Bernand	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 point	 out,	 exporters	 are	
larger,	 more	 productive,	 more	 capital	 and	 skill‐intensive	 and	 pay	 higher	 wages	 than	
non‐exporters,	and	Mayer	and	Ottaviano	(2008)	suggest	that	FDI‐makers	perform	better	
than	exporters.	In	addition,	in	many	countries	there	is	a	correlation	between	firms	that	
import	intermediate	inputs	and	those	that	export	(Bernand	et	al.,	2007).	Therefore,	the	
exporting	character	of	a	firm	will	be	indirectly	reflecting	the	offshoring	of	intermediate	
manufacturing	 inputs,	 which	 is	 an	 omitted	 variable	 in	 our	 model	 since	 there	 is	 no	
information	about	it	in	the	database.		
	
As	for	firm	size,	following	the	theory	of	human	capital	(Hamermesh,	1980,	1993;	Kremer	
1993;	Dunne	and	Schmitz,	1992),	the	most	skilled	workers	would	be	employed	by	large	
firms	due	to	aspects	such	as	the	complementarity	between	physical	and	human	capital,	
the	advantages	of	matching	skilled	workers	with	other	skilled	workers,	and	the	better	
                                                 
9 There are not any series of sectoral price indexes for services activities with the level of sectoral disaggregation 
needed for the analysis.  
10 When the model is estimated as a fixed effects model in panel data using a within-groups estimator, these 
dummies disappear. 
12 
 
capacity	 to	 amortize	 fixed	 costs associated with the	 hiring	 of	 skilled	 employees.	
Furthermore,	as	efficiency	wage	models	show,	given	that	monitoring	costs	are	higher	in	
large	firms,	it	would	be	preferable	for	them	to	hire	skilled	workers,	pay	good	wages,	and	
create	good	working	conditions	as	a	way	to	avoid	the	constant	search	for	workers	and	as	
an	incentive	for	employees	to	remain	in	the	firm	(Bulow	and	Summers,	1986).  
	
In	 Table	 3,	 the	 descriptives	 of	 the	main	 variables	 used	 in	 the	 estimations	 are	 shown.	
Near	62%	of	firms	are	exporters,	with	the	percentage	higher	in	the	manufacturing	sector	
higher	 than	 in	 the	services	 sector.	 In	addition,	 in	almost	10%	of	 firms	 the	presence	of	
foreign	capital	exceeds	50%	of	ownership.			
Insert	Table	3	about	here	
	
4.		Results	
	
In	 this	 section,	 we	 present	 the	 evidence	 obtained	 from	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 labor	
demand	function	in	equation	[5].	Because	of	the	 log‐linear	specification	of	the	demand	
function,	estimated	coefficients	of	continuous	explanatory	variables	can	be	 interpreted	
as	elasticities.		
Given	 the	 panel	 structure	 of	 the	 data,	 we	 have	 estimated	 the	 model,	 alternatively	
assuming	alternatively	a	fixed	effects	(FE)	model	and	a	random	effects	(RE)	model,	and	
we	use	a	Hausman	specification	test	to	choose	among	them.	As	it	is	well	known,	in	the	
FE	model	the	distribution	of	unobserved	heterogeneity	is	not	restricted,	and	nothing	is	
assumed	 regarding	 the	 correlation	 structure	 between	 the	 individual	 effects	 and	 the	
explanatory	 variables,	 as	 the	 formers	 are	 treated	 as	 parameters	 to	 be	 estimated	
differently	 for	 each	 firm.	 However,	 in	 a	 random	 effects	 model	 assumptions	 must	 be	
made	 about	 the	 distribution	 of	 unobserved	 heterogeneity,	 and	 this	 is	 difficult	 to	
establish	 especially	 when	 the	 unobservable	 effects	 are	 correlated	 with	 other	
explanatory	variables	
In	 our	 estimates,	 the	 coefficients	 of	 the	 FE	model	 have	 been	 obtained	 using	 a	within‐
groups	estimator,	while	the	coefficients	of	the	RE	model	come	from	a	Generalized	Least	
Squares	(GLS)	estimator.	In	both	cases,	we	previously	test	the	normality	assumption	of	
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errors,	so	 that	 there	exist	heteroskedastic	and	 first	order	autocorrelation.11	To	correct	
these	problems	we	calculate	panel‐corrected	standard	error	(PCSE)	estimates.12	
	
In	addition,	notice	that	to	develop	the	theoretical	model	we	have	assumed	that	the	firm	
minimizes	 costs	 in	 two	 stages:	 first,	 it	 chooses	 the	 quantity	 of	 traditional	 inputs,	 and	
afterwards	chooses	the	proportion	 in	which	 it	will	 import	material	and	service	 inputs.	
However,	 these	 decisions	 could	 be	 simultaneous.	 To	 control	 for	 the	 potential	
endogeneity	of	R&D	offshoring,	we	also	estimate	the	model	using	instrumental	variables	
approaches.	 In	particular,	we	 consider	 two	 supplementary	variables	as	 instruments:	 a	
dummy	 variable	 capturing	 the	 existence	 of	 technological	 agreements	 with	 foreign	
partners	 (international	 technological	cooperation),	 and	 the	percentage	of	 internal	R&D	
expenditures	 financed	 by	 foreign	 companies	 (proportion	 of	 foreign	 support	 for	 R&D).	
Sargan	overidentification	tests	are	used	to	see	the	validity	of	these	instruments	in	each	
specification.	
	
Table	4	reports	the	results	of	the	FE	and	RE	models	without	instruments,	as	well	as	the	
estimations	with	instrumental	variables	by	FE	two	stage	least	squares	(FE2SLS),	by	RE	
two	 stage	 least	 squares	 (RE2SLS),	 and	 by	 Baltagi’s	 error	 component	 two‐stage	 least	
squares	(EC2SLS)13,	respectively,	for	all	innovative	firms.	
Insert	Table	4	about	here	
When	models	without	instrumental	variables	are	considered	(columns	(1)	and	(2)),	the	
Hausman	 test	 confirms	 the	existence	of	 a	 correlation	between	observable	explanatory	
variables	 and	 individual	 firm	 effects,	 so	 the	 coefficients	 from	 the	 FE	 model	 are	 the	
consistent	 ones	 under	 the	 assumption	 of	 strict	 exogeneity	 of	 independent	 variables. 
However,	 as	 most	 control	 variables	 are	 time‐invariant	 and	 disappear	 in	 the	 within	
                                                 
11 In all cases, a modified Wald test is used to assess whether there exist is heteroskedasticity, as being the null 
hypothesis of constant variance is rejected. Additionally, a Wooldridge test confirms the presence of first order 
autocorrelation. These tests are available from the authors upon request. 
12 We use the “xtpcse” command in Stata. 
13 Baltagi’s EC2SLS, is a matrix- weighted average between 2SLS and FE2SLS, and therefore provides 
estimates for time invariant variables. See Baltagi (2008), chapter 7, section 7.1. 
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estimator,	we	keep	the	results	from	the	RE	model	to	have	an	intuition	about	their	impact	
on	labor	demand	for	researchers.14		
	
In	 both	 cases,	 R&D	 offshoring	 has	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 demand	 for	 researchers.	
However,	as	we	have	mentioned	previously,	we	must	be	cautious	when	interpreting	this	
result	as	a	causal	relationship	between	R&D	offshoring	and	the	demand	for	R&D	labor:	
the	 estimated	 coefficient	 could	 be	 biased	 upward	 if	 they	 were	 simultaneously	
determined	 by	 the	 firm.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 estimates	 by	 instrumental	 variables	
procedures	(columns	(3)	to	(5))	confirm	the	existence	of	a	positive	relationship,	with	the	
elasticity	being	between	0.08	and	0.24	depending	on	the	assumption	about	the	errors.	In	
particular,	the	coefficient	of	the	FE2SLS	model	implies	that	a	1	percentage	point	increase	
in	R&D	offshoring	raises	the	demand	for	researchers	by	about	8%.			
	
Therefore,	for	this	specific	type	of	highly	qualified	employment,	the	evidence	about	the	
impact	 of	 R&D	 offshoring	 seems	 to	 suggest	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 positive	 association	
between	R&D	employment	and	imported	R&D	services.	This	is	consistent	with	both	the	
hypothesis	that	they	are	strategic	complements,	and	the	prevalence	of	a	scale	effect:	an	
increase	 in	offshoring	would	make	 the	 firm	more	efficient	and	competitive,	 increasing	
the	demand	 for	 its	 product	 and	 for	 all	 types	 of	 employment.	 The	 result	 is	 also	 in	 line	
with	 previous	 empirical	 evidence	 that,	 with	 other	 levels	 of	 aggregation	 in	 the	 data,	
suggests	that	service	offshoring	increases	high	skilled	employment	(Crinò,	2010).			
	
As	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 variables,	 unsurprisingly	 the	 average	wage	 of	 researchers	 has	 a	
negative	 impact	 on	 their	 demand,	 the	 elasticity	 near	 ‐0.13.	 The	 wages	 of	 other	
employees	also	have	a	negative	relation	with	the	employment	of	researchers,	although	
the	 magnitude	 of	 this	 elasticity	 is	 lower.	 Domestic	 expenses	 on	 innovation	 have	 a	
positive	 effect	 on	 R&D	 employment,	 which	 is	 coherent	 with	 Trefler’s	 (2005)	 views,	
which	 indicates	 that	 in	 recent	 years	 there	 has	 been	 a	 rapid	 growth	 in	 services	 that	
involve	 simultaneously	 involve	 innovation,	 intensive	 processes	 in	 technology,	 and	
employment	for	white‐collar	workers.		
	
	
                                                 
14 We have also performed RE2SLS including industry dummies for 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 classes, and the main 
results remain unchanged. These estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
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All	 the	 control	 variables	 behave	 in	 accordance	 to	 the	 predictions	 of	 economic	 theory.	
When	taking	 into	consideration	the	variables	that	appear	 in	the	estimations	by	RE,	we	
observe	 that	 exporters,	 companies	 in	 high	 and	 medium‐tech	 sectors,	 especially	 in	
services	activities,	and	multinational	and	 large	 firms	tend	to	hire	more	researchers.	 In	
addition,	the	dummy	variable	for	manufacturing	firms	reflects	that	this	kind	of	company	
demands	less	R&D	employment.	
	
As	has	been	previously	argued,	authors	such	as	Jensen	(2009)	state	that	during	the	last	
decade,	offshoring	has	been	redirected	from	manufacturing	to	services.	For	that	reason,	
in	what	follows	the	results	are	analyzed	separately	for	the	manufacturing	sector	and	the	
services	sector	(see	Tables	5	and	6).	 In	both	samples	all	explanatory	variables	keep	 in	
general	their	signs	and	significance	in	general	with	respect	to	previous	estimates	for	all	
innovative	firms.		
Insert	Table	5	and	6	about	here	
In	addition,	when	only	firms	in	the	services	sector	are	analyzed,	R&D	offshoring	shows	a	
positive	association	with	the	demand	for	researchers,	as	the	elasticity	is	higher	than	in	
the	whole	sample.	 In	 this	case,	a	1	percentage	point	 increase	 in	R&D	offshoring	raises	
the	demand	for	researchers	by	around	11%	(see	column	(3)	in	Table	5).		Once	again,	this	
suggests	 that	 labor	demand	can	be	affected	 through	 the	scale	effect	or	 that	R&D	 labor	
and	imported	R&D	services	are	complements	inside	the	firm.		
	
The	 same	positive	 relationship	 is	 obtained	 in	 the	 sample	of	manufacturing	 companies	
(see	Table	6).	However,	in	this	case	the	elasticity	of	R&D	employment	to	R&D	offshoring	
is	half	of	what	it	is	in	services,	showing	that	the	demand	for	highly	skilled	labor	is	more	
sensitive	 to	 changes	 in	 offshoring	 in	 the	 latter	 sector,	 which	 is	 probably	 due	 to	 the	
nature	of	services	offshoring	that	we	are	considering	in	this	study.			
	
To	 study	 this	 question	more	 deeply,	 estimates	 in	 Table	 7	 split	 the	 sample	 of	 services	
firms	 in	 two	subsamples,	one	 for	 firms	operating	specifically	 in	 the	sector	of	Scientific	
research	and	development,	and	one	for	the	rest	of	the	services	firms.15		
	
                                                 
15	For	simplicity,	in	this	case	we	only	show	the	results	obtained	with	IV	procedures.		
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According	to	this	criterion,	the	results	establish	that	the	elasticity	of	R&D	employment	to	
imported	R&D	services	is	larger	when	we	exclude	the	firms	in	the	R&D	sector	from	the	
analysis.	 However,	 in	 this	 latter	 industry,	 the	 association	 is	 much	 weaker	 and	 even	
disappears	in	the	FE2SLS	model.		This	suggests	that	for	firms	in	R&D	activities	the	scale	
effect	could	be	partially	compensated	by	a	substitution	relation	between	both	inputs.	
Insert	Table	7	about	here	
Finally,	in	Table	8		we	proceed	to	estimate	the	conditional	labor	demand	for	researchers	
(equation	[3])	 in	the	manufacturing	sector,	given	that	 it	 is	the	only	sector	 in	which	we	
can	 take	 the	 firms’	 real	 output	 into	 consideration.	 With	 this	 estimation	 we	 aim	 to	
disentangle	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 scale	 effect	 previously	 mentioned	 from	 the	 potential	
complementarity	association	between	R&D	employment	and	imported	R&D	services.	As	
can	 be	 seen	 in	Table	 8,	 after	 adding	 the	 output	 to	 the	 specification,	 the	 effect	 of	 R&D	
offshoring	on	the	demand	for	researchers	remains	positive	and	significant,	although	the	
elasticity	 is	 smaller.	 This	would	 confirm	 that	 they	 are	 complements	 to	manufacturing	
firms.	
Insert	Table	8	about	here	
To	check	robustness,	we	have	re‐estimated	the	regressions	presented	 in	Tables	4	 to	8	
using	 alternative	 measures	 for	 wages	 and	 domestic	 innovation	 expenditures,	 but	 the	
results	remain	basically	the	same.16		
	
	
5.	Conclusions	
	
The	process	of	offshoring	has	been	done	in	different	ways	throughout	the	years.	Before	
the	 1990s,	 the	 objective	 of	 this	 strategy	 was	 mainly	 to	 reduce	 cost,	 especially	 in	 the	
manufacturing	 sector.	 In	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 new	 millennium,	 this	 phenomenon	
expanded	to	services	activities,	especially	with	the	development	of	ICTs,	the	exploitation	
of	new	markets,	and	the	development	of	new	products.	
	
                                                 
16 In particular, we have considered the average wage for R&D employment relative to the average wage of 
workers in the sector in which the firm operates. We have also tried to define domestic innovation expenditures 
by excluding not only the remuneration of researchers, but also the remuneration of technicians and assistants in 
R&D activities. The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Therefore,	 researches	 have	 worried	 about	 the	 causes,	 effects,	 and	 tendencies	 of	 this	
phenomenon.	 With	 respect	 to	 the	 studies	 that	 seek	 to	 analyze	 the	 consequences	 of	
offshoring	on	labor	markets,	one	of	the	main	debates	has	focused	on	how	materials	and	
services	 offshoring	 affect	 the	 demand	 for	 skilled	 and	 unskilled	 workers,	 or	 on	 their	
impact	on	wages	and	welfare.		
The	 objective	 of	 our	 study	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 this	 debate	 by	 analyzing	 the	 impact	 of	
offshoring	on	the	demand	for	one	of	the	most	qualified	workers:	researchers	involved	in	
R&D	 activities.	 We	 examine	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 offshoring:	 the	 purchases	 of	 R&D	
services	that	domestic	firms	contract	from	foreign	providers.	These	highly	technological	
activities	may	have	a	stronger	effect	on	the	demand	for	skilled	labor.	For	the	empirical	
analysis	we	use	firm‐level	data	of	Spanish	companies	for	the	period	2004‐2009	and	we	
quantify	the	effects	of	R&D	offshoring	within	firms	that	undertake	innovative	activities.		
We	find	evidence	of	a	positive	relation	between	R&D	offshoring	and	skilled	employment	
for	 Spanish	 firms.	 In	 particular,	 the	 estimates	 by	 instrumental	 variables	 procedures	
suggest	that	a	1	percentage	point	increase	in	R&D	offshoring	will	raise	the	demand	for	
researchers	by	about	8%.		This	result	is	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	that	both	inputs	
are	strategic	complements,	and	with	the	existence	of	a	scale	effect:	an	increase	in	R&D	
offshoring	would	make	 the	 firm	more	 efficient,	 increasing	 the	demand	 for	 its	 product	
and	for	all	types	of	employment.	This	conclusion	is	also	in	line	with	previous	empirical	
evidence	 with	 industry‐level	 data	 suggesting	 that	 service	 offshoring	 increases	 high	
skilled	employment	(Crinò,	2010).			
In	 addition,	 we	 find	 that	 the	 elasticity	 in	 services	 firms	 is	 double	 the	 elasticity	 in	
manufacturing	firms.	However,	as	we	would	expect	given	the	specific	type	of	offshoring	
considered	 in	 this	 study,	 the	magnitude	 of	 the	 elasticity	 is	 lower	 in	 the	 subsample	 of	
services	firms	performing	R&D	activities.	In	this	case,	the	scale	effect	could	be	partially	
compensated	by	a	substitution	relation	between	both	inputs.			
From	 our	 view,	 governments	 should	 be	 aware	 that	 R&D	 offshoring	 by	 services	 and	
manufacturing	firms	is	not	a	threat	but	an	opportunity,	because	of	its	complementarity	
with	 high	 skilled	 labor,	 which	 can	 be	 capitalized	 as	 long	 as	 public	 policies	 include	
programs	to	retrain	and	qualify	the	workforce	to	perform	the	required	tasks.	
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Table	1.		R&D	offshoring	by	activity	sector	and	technology	class	
	 Number	of	observations	
Activity	 Technology	class	 Firms	without	R&D	offshoring
Firms	with	R&D	
offshoring	 Total	
Services	
Low	technology	 8,672	(96%)	 319	(4%)	 8,991	
High	&	medium	technology	 5,548	(94%)	 378	(6%)	 5,926	
Total		 14,220	(95%)	 697	(5%)	 14,917	
Manufacturing	
Low	technology	 10,216	(94%)	 701	(6%)	 10,917	
High	&	medium	technology	 12,712	(91%)	 1,229	(9%)	 13,941	
Total		 22,928	(92%)	 1,930	(8%)	 24,858	
Total 37,148	(93.4%) 2,627	(6.6%)	 39,775
Source:	Own	calculation	from	the	PITEC	2004‐2009.	
Notes:	Percentages	over	the	total	in	each	row	are	shown	between	parentheses. See the correspondence of 
high and medium-tech activities and low activities and the two-digit NACE Rev.2 class in Annex 1. 
	
	
	
	
	
Table	2.		Average	wages	(in	€)	of	researchers	by	offshoring	strategy,	activity	and	size	
	 SMEs		(less	than	200	employees)	
Large	firms		
(200	employees	or	more)	
		 All	firms	
Firms	without	
R&D	
Offshoring	
Firms	with	
R&D	
Offshoring
All	firms
Firms	without	
R&D	
Offshoring		
Firms	with	
R&D	
Offshoring
Services	 46,078	 45,793	 51,189	 63,570	 62,727	 77,522	
High	&	medium‐tech		 43,531	 42,981	 51,063	 77,367	 75,657	 99,856	
Manufacturing	 47,511	 47,237	 52,799	 63,600	 61,156	 74,253	
High	&	medium‐tech		 48,928	 48,599	 54,535	 64,676	 63,792	 67,688	
Total		 46,937	 46,650	 52,340	 63,110	 61,192	 74,548	
Source:	Own	calculation	from	database	PITEC	2004‐2009.	
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Table	3.	Sample	averages	of	the	main	variables	
Variables	 All	Firms	 Manufacturing	firms		
Services	
firms
Domestic	innovation	expenditures	(inn)	(in	logs)	 11.8	 11.8	 11.8	
Exporterd	(%	observations)	 61.9	 77.5	 35.0	
Foreign	capitald	(%	observations)	 10.7	 13.2	 6.5	
High	and	medium‐tech	activity	sectord	(%	obs.)	 53.6	 59.1	 45.3	
International	technological	cooperation	(%	obs.)	 15.5	 15.1	 16.5	
Large	firmd	(%	observations)	 18.9	 20.6	 16.1	
Output		(Y)	(in	logs)	 ‐	 16.2	 ‐	
Proportion	of	foreign	support	for	R&D	(%)	 0.06	 0.02	 0.12	
Quantity	of	foreign	support	for	R&D	(in	logs)	 0.04	 0.01	 0.08	
R&D	employment	(LR&D)		 4.8	 3.6	 7.1	
R&D	employment	(LR&D)	(in	logs)	 0.36	 0.21	 0.62	
R&D	offshorerd	(%	observations)	 6.9	 7.7	 5.3	
R&D	offshoring	(oss)	(in	logs)	 0.77	 0.89	 0.59	
Total	employment	(L)	(n.	of	employees)	 236.7	 180.7	 340.4	
Wages	of	researchers	(wR)	(in	logs)	 10.6	 10.7	 10.6	
Wages	of	other	employees	(wO)	(in	logs)	 8.0	 8.3	 7.4	
Number	of	observations	 33,134	 20,893	 11,920	
Note:	d	=	dummy	variable	
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Table	4.		Demand	for	researchers	(in	logs).	All	innovative	firms.	
		 FE	 RE	 FE2SLS	 RE2SLS	 EC2SLS	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
R&D	offshoring	(in	logs) 0.009***	 0.025***	 0.078***	 0.128***	 0.239***	
(0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.013)	 (0.011)	 (0.013)	
Domestic	innovation	expenditures	
(in	logs)	 0.052***	 0.124***	 0.047***	 0.061***	 0.054***	(0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	
Wages	of	researchers	(in	logs)	 ‐0.125***	 ‐0.106***	 ‐0.127***	 ‐0.125***	 ‐0.131***	
(0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	
Wages	of	other	employees	(in	logs)	 ‐0.033***	 ‐0.035***	 ‐0.034***	 ‐0.033***	 ‐0.034***	
(0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Large	firm	
	
0.440***	
	
0.441***	 0.380***	
(0.015)	 (0.028)	 (0.038)	
Exporter	
	
0.091***	
	
0.147***	 0.128***	
(0.008)	 (0.022)	 (0.030)	
Foreign	capital	
	
0.107***	
	
0.035	 ‐0.073	
(0.016)	 (0.035)	 (0.047)	
Manufacturing	firm	
	
‐0.217***	
	
‐0.236***	 ‐0.271***	
(0.013)	 (0.029)	 (0.039)	
High	and	medium‐tech	manufact.	
	
0.258***	
	
0.235***	 0.230***	
(0.010)	 (0.025)	 (0.034)	
High	and	medium‐tech	services	
	
0.457***	
	
0.457***	 0.443***	
(0.018)	 (0.032)	 (0.044)	
Hausman	(p‐value)	 0.000	 0.000	 0.0000	
Test	of	joint	significance	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.0000	
Sargan	over‐identification	test	 χ2(1)=2.5	 χ2(1)=4.9	 	
					p‐value	 0.114	 0.027	 	
Number	of	observations	 33138	 33138	 31718	 33174	 33174	
Notes:	 Estimated	 standard	 errors	 between	 brackets.	 Coefficients	 significant	 at:	 1%***,	 5%**,	 10%*.	 All	
regressions	include	the	constant.	Hausman	reports	the	p‐value	from	a	test	under	the	null	hypothesis	that	
unobserved	firm	effects	are	uncorrelated	with	the	regressors.	The	test	of	joint	significance	of	the	variables	
reports	 the	 p‐value	 of	 a	 Wald	 test	 except	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 FE2SLS	 estimates,	 where	 the	 p‐value	
corresponds	to	an	F‐test.	The	instruments	used	are:	quantity	of	foreign	support	for	R&D	and	international	
technological	cooperation.	
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Table	5.		Demand	for	researchers	(in	logs).	Services	firms	
		
FE RE FE2SLS RE2SLS	 EC2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)	 (5)
Offshoring	(in	logs)	 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.106*** 0.196***	 0.360***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.029)	 (0.036)
Domestic	innovation	expenditures	
(in	logs)	 0.073*** 0.165*** 0.066*** 0.082***	 0.070***(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)	 (0.007)
Wages	of	researchers	(in	logs)	 ‐0.162*** ‐0.161*** ‐0.161*** ‐0.160***	 ‐0.162***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)	 (0.014)
Wages	of	other	employees	(in	logs)	 ‐0.041*** ‐0.042*** ‐0.041*** ‐0.040***	 ‐0.040***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)	 (0.002)
Large	firm		 0.380*** 0.417***	 0.485***
		 (0.029) (0.055)	 (0.080)
Exporter	 0.134*** 0.175***	 0.121
		 (0.016) (0.044)	 (0.063)
Foreign	capital	 0.057*** ‐0.078	 ‐0.247*
		 (0.033) (0.084)	 (0.119)
High	and	medium‐tech	sector	 0.428	*** 0.423***	 0.415***
		 (0.018) (0.042)	 (0.060)
Hausman	(p‐value)	 0.000 0.075	 0.000
Test	of	joint	significance	 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	 0.000
Sargan	over‐identification	test	(m)	 χ2(1)=1.9 χ2(1)=4.1	 	
					p‐value	 0.167 0.044	 	
Number	of	observations	 11922 11922 11258 11925	 11925
Notes:	 Estimated	 standard	 errors	 between	 brackets.	 Coefficients	 significant	 at:	 1%***,	 5%**,	 10%*.	 All	
regressions	include	the	constant.	Hausman	reports	the	p‐value	from	a	test	under	the	null	hypothesis	that	
unobserved	firm	effects	are	uncorrelated	with	the	regressors.	The	test	of	joint	significance	of	the	variables	
reports	 the	 p‐value	 of	 a	 Wald	 test	 except	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 FE2SLS	 estimates,	 where	 the	 p‐value	
corresponds	to	an	F‐test.	The	instruments	used	are:	quantity	of	foreign	support	for	R&D	and	international	
technological	cooperation.	
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Table	6.		Demand	for	researchers	(in	logs).	Manufacturing	firms	
		 FE	 RE	 FE2SLS	 RE2SLS	 EC2SLS	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Offshoring	(in	logs)	 0.007***	 0.024*** 0.056***	 0.094***	 0.181***	(0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.012)	 (0.010)	 (0.011)	
Domestic	innovation	expenditures	
(in	logs)	
0.039***	 0.099*** 0.036***	 0.051***	 0.046***	
(0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	
Wages	of	researchers	(in	logs)	 ‐0.107***	 ‐0.080*** ‐0.110***	 ‐0.105***	 ‐0.111***	(0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	
Wages	of	other	employees	(in	logs)	 ‐0.027***	 ‐0.028*** ‐0.028***	 ‐0.028***	 ‐0.028***	(0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Large	firm		 0.482*** 0.520***	 0.418***	(0.017)	 (0.028)	 (0.040)	
Exporter	 0.060*** 0.121***	 0.111***	(0.009)	 (0.022)	 (0.030)	
Foreign	capital	 0.128*** ‐0.003	 ‐0.045*	(0.017)	 (0.018)	 (0.023)	
High	and	medium‐tech	sector	 0.265*** 0.248***	 0.247***	(0.010)	 (0.019)	 (0.025)	
Hausman	(p‐value)	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
Test	of	joint	significance	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
Sargan	over‐identification	test	(m)	 χ2(1)=3.3	 χ2(1)=3.1	 	
					p‐value	 0.070	 0.080	 	
Number	of	observations	 21216	 21216	 20422	 21249	 21249	
Notes:	 Estimated	 standard	 errors	 between	 brackets.	 Coefficients	 significant	 at:	 1%***,	 5%**,	 10%*.	 All	
regressions	include	the	constant.	Hausman	reports	the	p‐value	from	a	test	under	the	null	hypothesis	that	
unobserved	firm	effects	are	uncorrelated	with	the	regressors.	The	test	of	joint	significance	of	the	variables	
reports	 the	 p‐value	 of	 a	 Wald	 test	 except	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 FE2SLS	 estimates,	 where	 the	 p‐value	
corresponds	to	an	F‐test.	The	instruments	used	are:	quantity	of	foreign	support	for	R&D	and	international	
technological	cooperation.	
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Table	7.		Demand	for	researchers	(in	logs).	Services	firms		
		
Except	firms	in	scientific	
research	and	development
Only	firms	in	scientific
research	and	development
		
FE2SLS RE2SLS EC2SLS FE2SLS	 RE2SLS	 EC2SLS
(6) (7) (8) (9)	 (10)	 (11)
Offshoring	(in	logs)	 0.137** 0.224*** 0.389*** 0.054	 0.088*	 0.108**
(0.044) (0.037) (0.044) (0.038)	 (0.037)	 (0.036)
Domestic	innovation	expenditures		 0.060*** 0.079*** 0.070*** 0.139***	 0.174***	 0.170***
(in	logs)	 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016)	 (0.016)	 (0.016)
Wages	of	researchers	(in	logs)	 ‐0.161*** ‐0.155*** ‐0.161*** ‐0.188***	 ‐0.192*** ‐0.190***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.027)	 (0.028)	 (0.029)
Wages	of	other	employees	(in	logs)	
‐0.043*** ‐0.043*** ‐0.043*** ‐0.023***	 ‐0.021*** ‐0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)
Large	firm		 	 0.346*** 0.397*** 	 1.904***	 1.892***
		 	 (0.046) (0.063) 	 (0.235)	 (0.247)
Exporter	 	 0.130*** 0.096 	 0.336**	 0.328*
		 	 (0.037) (0.051) 	 (0.13)	 (0.136)
Foreign	capital	 	 ‐0.001 ‐0.131 	 ‐0.413	 ‐0.489
		 	 (0.074) (0.098) 	 (0.290)	 (0.306)
High	and	medium‐tech	sector	 	 0.238*** 0.262*** 	 	 	
		 	 (0.036) (0.050) 	 	 	
Hausman	(p‐value)	 	 0.010 0.000 	 0.636	 0.8615
Test	of	joint	significance	 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
Sargan	over‐identification	test	(m)	 χ2(1)=0.8 χ2(1)=0.1 	 χ2(1)=0.2	 χ2(1)=2.0 	
						p‐value	 0.371 0.724 	 0.635	 0.161	 	
Number	of	observations	 9,560 10,220 10,220 1,685	 1,705	 1,705
Notes:	 Estimated	 standard	 errors	 between	 brackets.	 Coefficients	 significant	 at:	 1%***,	 5%**,	 10%*.	 All	
regressions	include	the	constant.	Hausman	reports	the	p‐value	from	a	test	under	the	null	hypothesis	that	
unobserved	firm	effects	are	uncorrelated	with	the	regressors.	The	test	of	joint	significance	of	the	variables	
reports	 the	 p‐value	 of	 a	 Wald	 test	 except	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 FE2SLS	 estimates,	 where	 the	 p‐value	
corresponds	to	an	F‐test.	The	instruments	used	are:	quantity	of	foreign	support	for	R&D	and	international	
technological	cooperation.	
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Table	8.		Conditional	demand	for	researchers	(in	logs).	Manufacturing	firms	
		
FE RE FE2SLS RE2SLS	 EC2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)	 (5)
Offshoring	(in	logs)	 0.006*** 0.022*** 0.054*** 0.089***	 0.166***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.010)	 (0.011)
Domestic	innovation	expenditures	
(in	logs)	
0.038*** 0.087*** 0.035*** 0.048***	 0.043***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)	 (0.003)
Wages	of	researchers	(in	logs)	 ‐0.109*** ‐0.095*** ‐0.112*** ‐0.110***	 ‐0.115***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)	 (0.007)
Wages	of	other	employees	(in	logs)	 ‐0.028*** ‐0.030*** ‐0.028*** ‐0.028***	 ‐0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)	 (0.001)
Large	firms		 	 0.289*** 	 0.346***	 0.271***
(0.018) (0.030)	 (0.042)
Exporter	 	 0.016 	 0.065**	 0.062*
(0.010) (0.022)	 (0.029)
Foreign	capital	 	 0.059** 	 ‐0.023	 ‐0.059**
(0.017) (0.018)	 (0.022)
High	and	medium‐tech	sector	 	 0.297*** 	 0.266***	 0.270***
(0.010) (0.019)	 (0.024)
Output	(in	logs)	 0.048*** 0.097*** 0.047*** 0.073***	 0.068***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)	 (0.008)
Hausman	(p‐value)	 0.000 0.000	 0.000
Test	of	joint	significance		 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	 0.000
Sargan overidentification	test	(m)	 χ2(1)=2.5 χ2(1)=2.0	 	
				p‐value	 0.111 0.158	 	
Number	of	observations	 20,895	 20,895	 20,112	 20,926	 20,926	
Notes:	 Estimated	 standard	 errors	 between	 brackets.	 Coefficients	 significant	 at:	 1%***,	 5%**,	 10%*.	 All	
regressions	include	the	constant.	Hausman	reports	the	p‐value	from	a	test	under	the	null	hypothesis	that	
unobserved	firm	effects	are	uncorrelated	with	the	regressors.	The	test	of	joint	significance	of	the	variables	
reports	 the	 p‐value	 of	 a	 Wald	 test	 except	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 FE2SLS	 estimates,	 where	 the	 p‐value	
corresponds	to	an	F‐test.	The	instruments	used	are:	quantity	of	foreign	support	for	R&D	and	international	
technological	cooperation.	
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Annex	1:	Sector	Classification	
Correspondence	of	low‐tech	and	high	&	medium‐tech	activities	and	the	two‐digit	NACE	
Rev.2	class	
	
	
NACE	Rev.	2		 Low‐tech	manufacturing
10	‐	12	 Food,	beverages and	tobacco
13	 Textile	
14	 Wearing	apparel
15	 Leather	and	footwear
16	 Wood	and	cork
17	 Paper	and	paper	products
18	 Printing	and	reproduction of	recorded	media
19	 Coke	and	refined	petroleum	products
22	 Rubber	and	plastic products
23	 Other	non‐metallic	mineral	products
24	 Basic	metals	
32	 Other	manufacturing
31	 Furniture	
33	 Repair	and	installation	of	machinery	and	equipment	
	 High	&	medium‐tech	manufacturing	
20	 Chemicals	and	chemical	products
21	 Pharmacy	
25	 Metal	products	(except	machinery	and	equipment)	
26	 Computer,	electronic	and	optical	products
27	 Electrical	equipment
28	 Machinery	and	equipment	n.e.c.
29	 Motor	vehicles,	trailers	and	semi‐trailers
30	 Other	transport	equipment
	 Low‐tech	services
45	‐	47	 Wholesale	and	retail	trade;	repair	of	motor	vehicles	and	motorcycles
49	‐	53	 Transportation and	storage
55	‐	56	 Accommodation	and	food	service	activities
64	‐	66	 Financial	and	insurance activities
68	 Real	estate	activities
69	‐	71,	73	‐	75	 Other	activities (except	R&D	services)
77	‐	82	 Administrative	and	support	service	activities
85	(except	854)	 Education	
86	‐	88	 Human	health	and	social	work	activities
90	‐	93	 Art,	entertainment	and	recreation
95	‐	96	 Other	service	activities
	 High	&	medium‐tech	services	
58	‐	63	 Information	and	communication
72	 Scientific	research	and	development
	
	
